Learning, heterogeneity, and complexity in the New Keynesian model by Calvert Jump, Robert et al.
Learning, Heterogeneity, and Complexity in the New
Keynesian Model∗
Robert Calvert Jump†
Cars Hommes‡ Paul Levine§
July 24, 2019
Abstract
We present a New Keynesian model in which a fraction n of agents are fully rational,
and a fraction 1− n of agents are bounded rational. After deriving a simple reduced
form, we demonstrate that the Taylor condition is sufficient for determinacy and sta-
bility, both when the proportion of fully rational agents is held fixed, and when it is
allowed to vary according to reinforcement learning. However, this result relies on the
absence of persistence in the monetary policy rule, and we demonstrate that the Tay-
lor condition is not sufficient for determinacy and stability in the presence of interest
rate smoothing. For monetary policy rules that imply indeterminacy, we demonstrate
the existence of limit cycles via Hopf bifurcation, and explore a rational route to ran-
domness numerically. Our results support the broader literature on behavioural New
Keynesian models, in which the Taylor condition is known to be a useful guide to
monetary policy, despite not always being sufficient for determinacy and/or stability.
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1 Introduction
The workhorse New Keynesian model is used by central banks, governments, and policy in-
stitutions, and defines the contemporary orthodoxy in monetary policy. This states that the
central bank should raise interest rates more than one-for-one with any observed increase
in inflation, such that the real interest rate increases in response to inflationary shocks,
and aggregate demand is subject to central bank control. This principle, translated into
the mathematics of DSGE models, ensures that the dynamics of output and inflation are
determinate and stable. However, the workhorse model relies on a number of simplifying
assumptions. In particular, the basic model assumes that any heterogeneity between house-
holds and firms can be ignored, and that all agents are endowed with the ability to form
rational expectations. These characteristics of the contemporary orthodoxy have been heav-
ily criticised since the 2008 crisis, encouraging the growth of a literature on behavioural New
Keynesian models (Calvert Jump and Levine, 2019).
The behavioural New Keynesian literature builds on the pioneering work of Branch and
Evans (2007), Branch and McGough (2004, 2009, 2010), and De Grauwe (2011, 2012a,b),
who present models in which a subset of agents form expectations in a bounded rational
manner. The size of this subset can be fixed, or can vary according to a learning dynamic.
Although the Taylor principle is neither necessary nor sufficient for determinacy and stability
in these models (Branch and McGough, 2010, 2016), it remains an important guide to
monetary policy. Pecora and Spelta (2017), for example, present a simple model in which
the Taylor condition is sufficient for stability, although convergence to the steady state can
be slow. This general result, in which the orthodox approach to monetary policy is qualified,
but remains correct in its basic logic, is supported by the review of monetary policy under
imperfect knowledge in Eusepi and Preston (2018). It is a useful contribution to the current
state of knowledge, and largely supports the existing framework.
In this paper, we present a model that supports this general result. It goes beyond the
existing behavioural New Keynesian literature by deriving analytical stability conditions in a
model with bounded rationality and rational expectations. We make two main contributions
to the literature. Our first contribution is the derivation of analytical stability conditions.
The existing literature tends to rely on numerical simulation to study the dynamics of be-
havioural New Keynesian models. While the benefits of numerical simulation are numerous,
we are of the opinion that analytical results, arrived at by the use of small models, provide
important insights1. Our second contribution is the use of the anticipated utility approach of
Kreps (1998). The majority of the existing literature on behavioural New Keynesian models
employs Euler learning, in which agents’ decisions are based on first order conditions to
maximisation problems. In contrast to the rational expectations solution, in which model
consistent expectations enter the first order conditions, Euler learning uses simple bounded
rational predictors alongside knowledge of the form of the rational expectations solution.
1This is a standpoint shared by, for example, Turnovsky (2011).
In the anticipated utility approach, henceforth AU, agents follow an optimal decision
rule conditional on their beliefs over aggregate states and prices2. This takes into account
all information available to the agent, and involves forecasts of variables external to them.
AU is similar - but not identical - to the internal rationality approach of Adam and Marcet
(2011), in which “agents maximize utility under uncertainty, given their constraints and
given a consistent set of probability beliefs about payoff-relevant variables that are beyond
their control or external”. With internal rationality, henceforth IR, beliefs take the form of
a well-defined probability measure over a stochastic process - the fully Bayesian plan. Adam
and Marcet (2011) and Adam et al. (2017) utilise the IR approach, whereas our paper and a
number of the applications cited below adopt AU. Cogley and Sargent (2008) compare AU
and IR and encouragingly find that AU can be seen as a good approximation to the fully
Bayesian plan3.
The AU approach was first used in a New Keynesian model in Preston (2005), and a
real business cycle model in Eusepi and Preston (2011). Adam and Marcet (2011) apply
the IR approach to asset pricing, Spelta et al. (2012) apply AU to a model of house prices,
Woodford (2013) apply AU to a New Keynesian framework, and Adam et al. (2017) apply IR
to a model of stock market booms. Massaro (2013) constructs a behavioural New Keynesian
model in which a fixed subset of agents are AU learners and the remaining subset are fully
rational. Of these existing studies, our approach is closest to Massaro (2013). Specifically,
we present a New Keynesian model in which a fraction n of agents are fully rational, and a
fraction 1− n of agents are AU learners, and use this to demonstrate the following results:
1. The Taylor condition is sufficient for determinacy and stability when n is fixed,
2. The Taylor condition is sufficient for local determinacy and stability when n varies
according to reinforcement learning,
3. When monetary policy is such that the dynamics are indeterminate, limit cycles can
exist, and may be followed by a rational route to randomness,
4. The Taylor condition is not sufficient for determinacy and stability in the presence of
interest rate smoothing.
Thus our results offer qualified support to the existing monetary policy orthodoxy, which is
consistent with the message of the behavioural New Keynesian literature.
2The anticipated utility approach with infinite time horizons is also referred the infinite-time horizon
approach. Bounded rationality of this form can be generalized to finite time horizons - see Lustenhouwer
and Mavromatis (2017) and Woodford (2019).
3See Branch and McGough (2016) and Deak et al. (2017) for further discussion. Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion
(2015) introduce forward-looking optimizing agents into an ACE framework. They use a concept that falls
within a general definition of AU which they refer to as “constructive rational decision making”. Graham
(2011) uses the term “individual rationality” to refer to the same general concept.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic New
Keynesian framework. Section 3 presents the New Keynesian model with AU households and
firms, and demonstrates our first proposition. Section 4 incorporates reinforcement learning,
and demonstrates our second and third propositions. Section 5 incorporates interest rate
smoothing, and demonstrates our fourth proposition. Section 6 concludes.
2 The New Keynesian model with rational expectations
In this section, we briefly recap the workhorse New Keynesian model with rational expec-
tations. We set up the model in a way the emphasises the link with bounded rationality
assuming anticipated utility, which should aid the reader when interpreting the models in
sections 3 and 4 below. We first consider the decision problems of households and firms,
and then the aggregation and equilibrium conditions.
2.1 Households
Let Ct(j) denote consumption and Ht(j) denote hours worked for the jth household. The






and households choose paths for consumption Ct(j), labour supply Ht(j), and holdings of
financial assets Bt(j), to maximise Et
∑∞
s=0 β
sUt+s(j) subject to the flow budget constraint,
Bt(j) = RtBt−1(j) +WtHt(j) + Γt(j)− Ct(j),
where Wt denotes the real wage, Γt denotes distributed profits, and Rt denotes the ex post
real interest rate paid on assets held at the beginning of period t. The first order conditions
















Usually, one analyses the New Keynesian model by log-linearising the first order conditions,
leading to the familiar consumption Euler equation and labour supply function,






where variables in lower case denote log-deviations.
As the labour supply function is static, it does not pose any particular problems when we
move from rational expectations to bounded rationality. The consumption Euler equation,
on the other hand, involves expectations of future variables, and a useful form of the house-
hold’s decision rule can be found by solving the household budget constraint forward in time
and imposing the Euler and transversality conditions. In symmetric equilibrium with zero









which states that the present value of consumption is equal to the present value of total














writing Rt,t+i ≡ RtRt+1Rt+2 · · ·Rt+i as the real interest rate over the interval [t− 1, t+ i].
Using exogenous point expectations, appendix B and the supplementary appendices D
and E demonstrates that the corresponding log-linearised consumption function is given by,
α1ct(j) = α2wt + α3(ω2,t + rt) + α4ω1,t, (2)
where,
ω1,t = α5Etwt+1 − α6Etrt+1 + βEtω1,t+1, (3)









denotes log-linearised dividends. Consumption is therefore a function of the current wage
and profit income, expected wage and profit income, and current and expected real interest
rates. The parameters and composite parameters are defined in table 1.
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Parameter Definition
α Elasticity of output with respect to labour input (α > 0)
β Representative household discount rate (0 < β < 1)
Υ Fixed cost of rational expectations predictor (−∞ < Υ <∞)
ζ Elasticity of substitution between consumption goods (ζ ≥ 0)
θπ Monetary policy rule elasticity of inflation (θπ ≥ 0)
θy Monetary policy rule elasticity of output (θy ≥ 0)
µ Intensity of choice parameter (µ > 0)
ξ Calvo probability that firms change price (0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1)
φ Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply (φ > 0)
α1 α1 = 1 + α/φ
α2 α2 = α(1− β) (1 + 1/φ)
α3 α3 = 1− α
α4 α4 = αβ
α5 α5 = (1− β) (1 + 1/φ)
α6 α6 = 1 + 1/φ
δ δ = (1− ξ)(1− βξ)−1
κ κ = (1− ξ)(1− βξ)(1 + φ)(αξ)−1
ψ ψ = (1− βξ)−1
A A = (θπκ− θπκψ)(βθy)−1
B B = (θy + θπκψ)(βθy)
−1
C C = (κ− δβθy − κψ)(βθy)−1
D D = (δβθy + κψ)(βθy)
−1
Table 1: Parameters, parameter definitions, and composite parameter definitions.
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2.2 Firms
Firms in the retail sector uses a homogeneous wholesale good to produce a basket of differen-
tiated goods for aggregate consumption. Consumers choose the consumption of variety m at
a price Pt(m) to maximise a standard CES sub-utility function with elasticity of substitution





















is the aggregate price index, and Ct, Yt, and Pt are Dixit-
Stigliz aggregates (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).





Following Calvo (1983), there is a probability 1 − ξ in each period that the price of each
variety m is set optimally to P 0t (m). If the price is not re-optimized, then it is held fixed.
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For each retail producer m, given its real marginal cost MCt, the objective is at time t to



















where Λt,t+k ≡ βk UC,t+kUC,t is the stochastic discount factor over the interval [t, t + k]. The


















4Thus we can interpret 11−ξ as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
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Denoting the numerator and denominator by Ω3,t and Ω4,t and introducing a mark-up shock












Ω4,t − ξEt[Λt,t+1Πζ−1t+1 Ω4,t+1] = Yt.
Using the fact that all resetting firms will choose the same price, by the Law of Large
Numbers we can find the evolution of inflation given by,
1 = ξ (Πt−1,t)






In a zero-net inflation steady state, the linear choice for the optimizing retail firm m found
by linearizing these equations about the deterministic steady state is given by,
pot (m)− pt = ω3,t − ω4,t, (5)
where pot (m) is the optimal price for firm m, and,
ω3,t = ξβEt+1 [ζπt+1 + ω3,t+1] + (1− βξ)(yt + uC,t +mct +mst),
ω4,t = ξβEt+1 [(ζ − 1)πt+1 + ω4,t+1] + (1− βξ)(yt + uC,t),
where πt is the aggregate inflation rate, yt is aggregate output, uC,t is household marginal
utility, mct is marginal cost, and mst is an exogenous supply shock. Finally, for the wholesale
sector we have,
yt = αht,
mct = wt − yt + ht.
Note that labour productivity is assumed to be constant, so the only exogenous driving
variable is the shock process mst.
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2.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
Assuming a unit measure of households and retail firms, aggregation under symmetry entails
ct(j) = ct, ht(j) = ht, p
o
t (m) = p
o
t , and ξπt = (1 − ξ)(pot − pt). Equilibrium in the output
market requires yt = ct. The model is completed with a Fisher equation,
rt = rn,t−1 − πt,
where rn,t is the nominal interest rate, and a policy rule of the form,
rn,t = θππt + θyyt. (6)
We confine our attention to implementable policy rules, and postpone until section 5 a
discussion of rules with persistence.
2.4 Reduced form
Imposing the aggregation and equilibrium conditions, we arrive at the workhorse New Key-
nesian three equation model,
yt = Etyt+1 − (rn,t − Etπt+1), (7)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt +mst), (8)
rn,t = θππt + θyyt. (9)
Before presenting the determinacy condition, two points about this formulation need to
be made. First, there is no lagged output in the demand curve (7), nor lagged inflation
in the Phillips curve (8). These can enter through the introduction of external habit in
households’ utility functions and price indexing, respectively. But we choose to focus on
bounded rationality as a persistence mechanism, so both of these features are omitted.
Second, even without these persistence terms, the linearisation is only correct about a zero
inflation steady state.
To find the determinacy and stability condition for the rational expectations model in
(7) - (9), we write the model in state space form, setting mst = 0 and substituting out rn,t
from (7) using (9). We then have, Etyt+1
Etπt+1
 =







Denote the trace of the system in (10) by τ , and the determinant by ∆. These are,
τ = 1 + θy + κ/β + 1/β,
∆ =
1 + θy + κθπ
β
.
For stability, we simply require a stable shock process mst. For determinacy, we require
that both of the eigenvalues of the system in (10) lie outside the unit circle, as both yt and
πt are jump variables (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Necessary and sufficient conditions are
(Woodford, 2003a),
1. ∆ > 1,
2. 1− τ + ∆ > 0,
3. 1 + τ + ∆ > 0.
As β < 1 and θy + κθπ > 0, condition 1 is always satisfied, and the binding condition is






θy > 1. (11)
3 The New Keynesian model with anticipated utility
We now extend the standard New Keynesian model to include both AU and fully rational
households and firms. This allows us to demonstrate our first proposition, and forms the
basis of the model with reinforcement learning in section 4.
3.1 Households
We distinguish between the consumption of fully rational households, cREt , and AU house-
holds, cAUt . The consumption of fully rational households is pinned down by the rational
expectations Euler equation as before,
cREt = Et
[
cREt+1 − (rn,t − πt+1)
]
, (12)
where we have omitted the household index to reduce notational clutter. With Euler learning
(henceforth EL), as in Branch and McGough (2010), the consumption of bounded rational
households would be pinned down by the Euler equation,
cELt = E∗t
[




where E∗t denotes a bounded rational expectations operator. Hence households base their
consumption decisions on forecasts of the same decision in future periods.
As discussed in the introduction, we replace Euler learning with anticipated utility.
Expectation formation discussed in more detail in the next section uses the predictor





























ω2,t = (1− β)γAUt + βE∗tγAUt+1 −
(











Hence AU households base their consumption decisions on forecasts of the variables exoge-
nous to them - wages, profits, interest rates, and inflation rates.
We now have to differentiate between the profit flows accruing to AU and fully rational
households. In the general case, with a fully specified market for the ownership of firms, an
individual household’s profit earnings would depend on their entire history of strategy choice
over fully rational and AU behaviour, leading to a complicated distribution over households.
To avoid this - and ensure tractability - Massaro (2013) assumes that profit is distributed
equally across households. We take a different approach, and assume that profits accrue to



















This is the major simplifying assumption that allows us to derive straightforward expres-
sions of the model’s reduced form, which in turn allows us to derive analytical stability and
bifurcation conditions. In fact, it is the only material difference between the microfoun-
dations of our model and that of Massaro (2013). Although the assumption is relatively
unusual, it is in a similar spirit to an assumption of equal distribution, and ensures that
γt = nγ
RE
t + (1− n)γAUt in each period, where n is the proportion of fully rational agents.
As before, optimal labour supply is an intra-temporal decision, so we have,
















where hREt is the labour supply of fully rational households, and h
AU
t is the labour sup-
ply of AU households. These labour supply functions provide more insight into the profit















Thus RE households receive more dividends relative to AU households when they are con-
suming more, and vice versa. Note that, as both consumption and labour supply are pro-
cyclical, dividends increase with output and hours worked in equilibrium.
3.2 Firms
As for firms with rational expectations, optimal price setting for AU retail firms is given by,
(pot − pt)AU = βξE∗t [πt+1 + (pot+1 − pt+1)AU ] + (1− βξ)(mct +mst). (18)
Solving forwards yields,
(pot − pt)AU = E∗t
∞∑
i=0
(βξ)i[βξπt+i+1 + (1− βξ)(mct+i +mst+i)]. (19)
Note that AU for retail firms is more straightforward than for households, as the rational ex-
pectations solution is already in recursive form and there is no retail firm budget constraint.
Note also that with AU we do not impose the aggregation relationship ξπt = (1− ξ)(pot −pt)
used in the RE solution as this requires firms to know that they are identical.
3.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
Without loss in generality, for reasons given in section 3.5, suppose that the proportion n of
fully rational households in the economy is equal to the proportion of fully rational firms.
Assuming a unit measure of households, aggregation entails,
ncREt + (1− n)cAUt = ct, (20)
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nhREt + (1− n)hAUt = ht, (21)
n(pot − pt)RE + (1− n)(pot − pt)AU = pot − pt, (22)
ξπt = (1− ξ)(pot − pt). (23)
The equilibrium conditions, Fisher equation, and the monetary policy rule are exactly the
same as in the standard rational expectations model.
3.4 Expectation formation of AU agents
Equations (12) - (23) define the New Keynesian model with AU up to the definition of the
bounded rational predictor E∗t . To close the model, we therefore need to specify the manner
in which AU households and firms form their expectations. As discussed in Calvert Jump
and Levine (2019), there is a large literature discussing departures from full rationality
in expectations formation, with a comprehensive survey of the studies preceding the 2008
financial crisis contained in Pesaran and Weale (2006). A notable post-crisis paper is Pfajfar
and Santoro (2010), who find that only 10% of the forecasts in the Michigan Survey reflect
regular information updating. A useful simplified predictor in this context is the static
predictor in which future values of a variable are forecast as equal to the last observed value
of that variable, i.e.,
E∗t [xt+1] = xt−i,
for some random variable x, where i ≥ 0 determines the last observed value. This is the
extrapolative predictor used in chapter 1 of De Grauwe (2012b), and is a special case of
the bounded rational predictor used in Branch and McGough (2010). It is the optimal
predictor when agents believe that x follows a random walk, which is a relatively accurate
approximation to most macroeconomics variables (Nelson and Plosser, 1982).
Given the foregoing, we assume that AU households and firms assume that the variables
of interest to them follow random walks, and therefore forecast all variables as equal to
their last observed values. We assume that variables which are local to the agents, in a
geographical sense, are observable within the period, whereas variables that are strictly
macroeconomic are only observable with a lag. This categorization regarding information
about the current state of the economy follows Nimark (2014). He distinguishes between
the local information that agents acquire directly through their interactions in markets and
statistics that are collected and summarised, usually by governments, and made available to
the wider public6. The only exception to this is the nominal interest rate, which we assume
6His paper actually focuses on a third category, information provided by the news media, and allows for
imperfect information in the form of noisy signals, issues which go beyond the scope of our paper.
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is observable within the period given the timing structure of New Keynesian models. Thus
AU household expectations are given by,
E∗twt+1 = wt, (24)
E∗tγt+1 = γt, (25)
E∗t rn,t+1 = rn,t, (26)
E∗tπt+1 = πt−1, (27)
and AU firm expectations are given by,
E∗tmct+1 = mct, (28)
E∗tπt+1 = πt−1. (29)
AU firms can observe their own marginal costs within the period, but in a similar manner to
AU households, can only observe aggregate inflation with a lag. Note that firms observing
their real marginal costs within the period, and households observing their real wage and
profits within the period, does not imply that firms and households observe the aggregate
price level within the period. We assume that they observe their own price within the
period, and therefore their own real marginal costs, real wages, and dividends, but not
the aggregate price level. This is reasonable given the considerable data-gathering costs of
observing aggregate macroeconomic variables like inflation, as discussed in Nimark (2014).
Note, however, that fully rational agents observe all variables within the period, and that
we retain the Taylor rule (9) and assume that the central bank observes current inflation
and output, thus having the same information advantage as rational agents.
3.5 Reduced form
Equations (12) - (29) fully describe the New Keynesian model with AU, where the pro-
portion n of fully rational agents is held constant. Deriving the reduced form is relatively
straightforward. First, by rearranging the AU household consumption function (13) after
substituting in the expectations functions, we find that AU households choose their level of
consumption such that,
rn,t = πt−1, (30)
in each period. The derivation of (30) is discussed in some detail in appendix A.
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which greatly simplifies the analysis, as we will not need to track output as a separate state
variable. In fact, as (31) means that we do not have to separately track the consumption
levels of fully rational and AU households in the state space form, it is this result that allows
us to derive analytical stability conditions in the sequel. Also note that (31) means that
the proportion of fully rational households does not affect the equation of motion for yt,
which allows us to assume that the proportion of fully rational households is equal to the
proportion of fully rational firms without loss of generality.
Using the aggregation conditions (22) and (23), and the price setting conditions (18) and
(19), we can derive the reduced form New Keynesian Phillips curve with fully rational and
AU firms,
πt = n(βEtπt+1 + κyt) + (1− n)(δβπt−1 + κψyt), (32)
where the shocks process mst is set equal to zero, mct = yt(1 + φ)/α, and the composite
parameters κ, δ, and ψ are defined in table 1. Finally, by substituting the equation of motion
for output (31) into the New Keynesian Phillips curve (32) and rearranging, we arrive at














where the composite parameters are defined in table 1.
3.6 State space form and stability
The New Keynesian model with fixed proportions n of fully rational agents and (1− n) of
AU agents, has a reduced form (33) described by a second order forward looking difference
equation in inflation. Define the auxiliary variable zt = πt−1. Then the state space form of
our model is given by, Etπt+1
zt+1
 =






where πt is a jump variable and zt is a pre-determined variable. We are now in a position
to demonstrate our first proposition:
Proposition 1: If the monetary policy rule is such that the condition in (11) holds, then
the model in (34) is determinate and stable.
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Proof of proposition 1: The proof is composed of two lemmas:
Lemma 1: For n ∈ (0, 1], if the monetary policy rule is such that the condition in
(11) holds, then the model in (34) is determinate and stable.
Proof of lemma 1: Determinacy and stability in the model described by (34) with
n ∈ (0, 1] requires one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and one eigenvalue outside the
unit circle (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Denote the trace of the system in (34) by
τ = A + B/n and the determinant by ∆ = C + D/n. As τ and ∆ are positive, the
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy and stability in the model described








where ε is an arbitrarily small but positive constant (i.e. the condition in (11) holds), so




(τ −∆) < 0 ∀n ∈ (0, 1], (36)
i.e. τ −∆ increases from 1 as n decreases from 1. From (34), we have,
d
dn
(τ −∆) = (D −B)n−2.









which, by substituting (35) into (37), yields,
d
dn






As κ, ψ, β, and θy are all positive (see table 1), (38) implies (36). This is illustrated
graphically in figure 1, which shows the standard stability plot in the trace and deter-
minant for a second order difference equation when both the trace and determinant
are positive (see e.g. Hamilton 1994, chapter 1). 
Lemma 2: For n = 0, if the monetary rule is such that the condition in (11) holds,














 = A + B/n
 = 
C + D/n
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of proposition 1, showing a stability plot in the trace τ
and determinant ∆ for a second order difference equation when τ > 0 and ∆ > 0. At point
P, which lies within the saddle path stable region (i.e. it satisfies τ −∆ > 1), a decrease in
n moves the model to P′ or P′′ if ∂τ
∂(−n) <
∂∆




∂(−n) . Thus a decrease









Proof of lemma 2: When n = 0, there are no agents with rational expectations, and
therefore determinacy is irrelevant. From (32), the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
given by,
πt = δβπt−1 + κψyt, (39)







The model in (40) is stable when the coefficient on πt−1 is less than one in absolute
value. As the coefficient will be positive given the parameter definitions in table 1,




Rearranging, and taking advantage of the parameter definitions, we arrive at a stability
condition identical to (11). Therefore, the model in (34) with n = 0 is stable if the
condition in (11) holds, which completes the proof of proposition 1. 
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IRF with n = 0.1
IRF with n = 0.5
IRF with n = 0.9
Figure 2: Impulse response functions of inflation to a positive marginal cost shock, for the
model with n fixed, for three different values of n. The remaining parameter values are
φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75, θπ = 1.25, θy = 0.5.
Proposition 1 states that the rational expectations determinacy condition is sufficient for
determinacy and stability in the model with fixed proportions of fully rational and AU
agents. However, the dynamics of the model will vary with n, as the magnitude of the
eigenvalues will change as n changes. This is illustrated in figure 2, which plots impulse
response functions of inflation in response to an ms shock with n = 0.1, n = 0.5, and
n = 0.9. The remaining parameter values are φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75,
θπ = 1.25, θy = 0.5, such that the condition in (11) holds, and the marginal cost shock
has no persistence. Although the determinacy and stability properties of the model are
unaffected by a reduction in n, given that (11) holds, the response of the model to shocks
becomes increasingly persistent as the proportion of fully rational agents decreases. This
result is consistent with the results of Pecora and Spelta (2017), who find that convergence
to the steady state can be slow in models with heterogeneous expectations, despite the
Taylor principle being sufficient for stability.
4 The New Keynesian model with strategy switching
In this section, we extend the analysis to allow n to vary. Following the literature, we assume
that n varies according to a reinforcement learning mechanism laid out in section 4.1. We
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then derive the reduced form in section 4.2, and consider the state space form and local
stability conditions in section 4.3. We establish our second and third propositions in this
section. First, the rational expectations determinacy condition ensures local determinacy
and stability in the model with n variable. Second, if the model starts from a position of
indeterminacy, an increase in the fixed cost of being fully rational can lead to the loss of
local stability via a Hopf bifurcation. This Hopf bifurcation appears to be super-critical,
giving rise to stable limit cycles. As the speed at which agents learn increases, a rational
route to randomness appears to follow, which we explore with numerical methods.
4.1 Reinforcement learning and predictor fitness
We extend the model to allow n to vary with the perceived relative forecasting strength of the
fully rational and AU predictors. Following Branch and McGough (2010) and the literature
described in the introduction, denote the fitness of the rational expectations predictor by
vREt , and the fitness of the AU predictor by v
AU
t . Then the proportion of fully rational
agents at any point in time is given by,
nt =
exp[µvREt ]




The parameter µ in (42) is referred to as the intensity of choice parameter, as a higher µ
increases the rate at which agents choose strategies with a high fitness level. In this sense,
µ governs the speed of learning.
Denote the perceived mean squared error of the AU predictor by Φt, and define it as
follows,
Φt = (πt − E∗t−1[πt])2 = (πt − πt−2)2. (43)
If - as we will do in the sequel - we consider a deterministic economy, the mean squared
error of the fully rational predictor is zero, as rational expectations is equivalent to perfect
foresight in this context. Finally, and in accordance with the literature, we define the fitness
measures as follows,
vREt = −Υ, (44)
vAUt = −Φt, (45)
where Υ is a fixed cost of using the fully rational predictor. The AU predictor is then fit
relative to the fully rational predictor when the mean squared error falls below the fixed
cost of being fully rational.
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4.2 Reduced form
Equations (12) - (29), extended to allow n to vary with equations (42) - (45), fully describe
the New Keynesian model with fully rational and AU agents, where the proportion n of
fully rational agents varies over time according to the perceived relative fitness of the two







exp[−µΥ] + exp[−µ(πt − πt−2)2]
. (46)
Thus, as the perceived mean squared error of the AU predictor falls below the fixed cost, Υ,
of being fully rational, agents move towards being AU and n falls. The speed of this process
is determined by the intensity parameter µ. Note that (46) implies,
n−1t = 1 + exp[−µ((πt − πt−2)2 −Υ)]. (47)
As we have changed nothing in the original model other than allowing n to vary, the original














with A, B, C, and D defined as before. Finally, substituting (47) into (48), we arrive at the
















The reduced form (49) is a highly non-linear third order difference equation. The state
space form, which we turn to next, simplifies the expression somewhat and allows analytical
stability conditions to be derived.
4.3 State space form and stability
As before, define the auxiliary variable zt = πt−1, and define a second auxiliary variable





























where πt is a jump variable and zt and zzt are pre-determined variables. In the steady state,
πt = zt = zzt = 0, and nt = (1 + e
µΥ)−1. Therefore, the Jacobian matrix J evaluated at the

















For local determinacy and stability we require two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix (50)
inside the unit circle, and one eigenvalue outside. Local indeterminacy occurs when all
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix (50) are inside the unit circle. If a pair of eigenvalues
are complex conjugates, as they pass through the unit circle a Hopf (or Neimark-Sacker)
bifurcation occurs (see e.g. Hommes (2013), chapter 3). Proposition 2 considers the case of
local determinacy and stability, and proposition 3 considers the case of local indeterminacy
and Hopf bifurcation.
Proposition 2: If the monetary policy rule is such that the condition in (11) holds, then
the model in (49) is locally determinate and stable.
Proof of proposition 2: At the steady state, nt = (1 + e
µΥ)−1. As µ ∈ [0,∞) and
Υ ∈ (−∞,∞), nt ∈ (0, 1) at the steady state. The proof then follows directly from lemma
1: as the model with fixed n is stable and determinate when the condition in (11) holds, the
model with variable n is locally stable and determinate when the condition in (11) holds. 
Proposition 3: Local indeterminacy and stability in the model described by (49) requires
all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. In this case, an increase in Υ can lead to a loss of local
stability via a Hopf bifurcation.
Proof of proposition 3: Consider the mapping xt+1 = F (xt, ϕ), xt ∈ Rn, and ϕ ∈ R
is a parameter. Following Iooss et al. (1981) and Gabisch and Lorenz (1987), we have the
following theorem:
Hopf: Let the mapping xt+1 = F (xt, ϕ), xt ∈ Rn, ϕ ∈ R, have a fixed point
at the origin. If there is a ϕ0 such that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the
origin has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues λ1,2 which lie on the unit
circle, while the remainder of its spectrum lies at a non-zero distance from the





then if λn(ϕ0) 6= ±1 for n = 1, 2, 3, 4, there is an invariant closed curve bifur-
cating from ϕ = ϕ0. So, as a parameter ϕ is varied, a stable fixed point loses
stability as a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues crosses the unit circle7.
Denote the trace of the Jacobian in (50) by τ = A+B(1 + eµΥ). By inspection, the matrix
is non-invertible, so the determinant ∆ = 0, and at least one eigenvalue is equal to zero. In
fact, the eigenvalues of (50) are given by,
λ1,2 = τ/2±
√
τ 2/4−∆0, λ3 = 0,
where ∆0 = C + D(1 + e
µΥ) is the pseudo-determinant of (50), i.e. the product of the
non-zero eigenvalues. When ∆0 > τ
2/4 so the non-zero eigenvalues are complex conjugate,
let λ1,2 = β1 ± β2i, where β1 = τ/2 and β2 =
√
∆0 − τ 2/4. The modulus of the complex






from which it follows that mod(λ1,2) =
√
∆0. As the remaining eigenvalue λ3 = 0, we require
∆0 to equal unity for a Hopf bifurcation to occur.
Now, as ∆0 = C +D(1 + e
µΥ), mod(λ1,2) = 1 when,
C +D(1 + eµΥ) = 1. (51)








As the right hand side of (52) is finite, as Υ → ∞, ∆0 will pass through unity from below









Therefore, if the non-zero eigenvalues are complex conjugate as ∆0 passes through unity,
the model undergoes a Hopf bifurcation. This is illustrated graphically in figure 3, which
presents the same stability plot as in figure 1, as the model in (49) linearised is effectively
a second order difference equation, but with the region of complex conjugate eigenvalues
highlighted. 
7This wording largely follows Iooss et al. (1981), although it has been altered slightly to fit with the













 = A + B(1+e )
0 = 
C + D(1+e )
 0 = 
2/4
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of proposition 4, showing a stability plot in the trace τ
and pseudo-determinant ∆0 for the model in (49). Note this looks exactly the same as the
stability plot in figure 1, as the linearised model is effectively a second order difference
equation in πt and zt, but we have now shaded the region of complex conjugate eigenvalues
with grey lines. As the model moves from points P to P′, as Υ is increased, a Hopf
bifurcation takes place.
4.4 Rational route to randomness
Proposition 3 demonstrates that an increase in the fixed cost of being fully rational can lead
to the loss of local stability via a Hopf bifurcation if the model starts from a position of
local indeterminacy. The existence of limit cycles therefore depends on the monetary policy
rule and Υ. Figure 4 presents a plot of a single simulated trajectory of the model in (49),
numerically demonstrating the existence of a stable limit cycle in the inflation rate. The
underlying parameterisation is the same parameterisation used in the rest of the paper, and
is a fairly standard prior for the basic New Keynesian model.
The existence of a Hopf bifurcation and stable limit cycles indicate the possibility of a
rational route to randomness. Following Brock and Hommes (1997), this is a bifurcation
route to instability, cycles, and chaos as the intensity of choice parameter µ increases.
Mathematically, this route to chaos is associated with the emergence of a homoclinic loop,
as the equilibrium becomes a saddle-focus with one stable and two unstable eigenvalues
after the Hopf bifurcation, associated with a one dimensional stable manifold and a two
dimensional unstable manifold, respectively. In fact, proposition 5.5.2 in Hommes (2013)
would lead us to expect the existence of a homoclinic loop in the model considered here.
Retaining the same underlying parameterisation, and setting Υ = 0.1, figures 5 and 6 plot
several trajectories as µ increases. As is evident from the plots, the stable limit cycle quickly
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Figure 4: Phase plot of inflation with n variable, illustrating a stable limit cycle. The
parameter values are φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75, θπ = 0.5, θy = 4, µ = 1, Υ = 0.
loses its smoothness as µ increases, and then varies between periodic attractors and strange
attractors. This evolution is not dissimilar to the evolution in the Henon-like map discussed
in Gonchenko et al. (2014), in which simple Shilnikov scenarios in three dimensional maps
are discussed in some detail. Finally, figure 7 plots a bifurcation diagram as µ is increased,
and the simulated largest Lyapunov exponents for the model over the same range of µ. Both
panels in figure 7 are plotted using the software E&F Chaos - see Diks et al. (2008).
The bifurcation diagram is constructed by simulating the model for T periods, k times
for k different values of µ equally spaced between 1 and 3. For each of the k values of
µ, this yields T different simulated values of inflation which are plotted on the vertical
axis (although a long burn-in period for each simulation ensures that the simulated values
of inflation constitute the fixed point(s) for the system). The Lyapunov exponents are
simulated, and measure the average rate of separation of a trajectory before and after a
small perturbation. As a positive Lyapunov exponent is an important indicator of chaos,
we can state with some confidence that the model in (49) displays a rational route to
randomness.
Unsurprisingly, as proposition 5.5.2 in Hommes (2013) leads us to expect the existence
of a homoclinic loop, there exist parameterisations in which near-homoclinic trajectories are
particularly apparent in numerical simulation. Figure 8 presents an example of this, and
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Figure 5: Simulated trajectories for various values of µ, illustrating the rational route to
randomness. The remaining parameter values are φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75,
θπ = 0.3, θy = 1, Υ = 0.1.
plots the phase diagram in two dimensions and three dimensions. The plotted trajectory
starts very close to the steady state, and spirals away from it across the unstable manifold.
Throughout this process the proportion of AU agents fluctuates with the fluctuations in
inflation. As the trajectory gets further from the steady state, it becomes increasingly
difficult to forecast, leading to agents shifting away from the AU predictor towards the
rational expectations predictor for longer periods of time. At this point the model stabilises,
and re-approaches the steady state down the stable manifold. The corresponding time series
of inflation and n, the proportion of rational firms, are plotted in figure 9, which illustrates
this dynamic from a different perspective. This dynamic is common to models of this form,
in which agents shift between destabilising bounded rational predictors and stabilising fully
rational predictors, following Brock and Hommes (1997).
4.5 Robustness to the timing assumptions
In the models above, we assume that the proportion of rational and bounded rational agents
changes based on inflation information within the period, i.e.,
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Figure 6: Simulated trajectories for various values of µ, illustrating the rational route to
randomness. The remaining parameter values are φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75,
θπ = 0.3, θy = 1, Υ = 0.1.
n−1t = 1 + exp[−µ((πt − πt−2)2 −Υ)], (53)
as in (47). It might be argued, however, that this is an awkward assumption given that
only RE agents observe inflation within the period when they form their expectations.
Fortunately this timing assumption is not crucial, as the strategy switching dynamic only
enters the model in a nonlinear fashion. To see this, consider the case in which strategy
switching only uses information available at time t−1. In this case, a reasonable alternative
measure of the mean squared error of the bounded rational predictor is,
Φt = (E∗t [πt]− E∗t−1[πt])2 = (πt−1 − πt−2)2, (54)














































B: Largest Lyapunov exponent
Figure 7: Panel A: Bifurcation plot of the orbit of inflation against µ. Panel B: Largest
Lyapunov exponent against µ. The parameter values are φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99,
ξ = 0.75, θπ = 0.3, θy = 1, Υ = 0.1.
Clearly, the Jacobian matrix for this model is exactly the same as the Jacobian for the model

















as altering the timing assumptions has no effect on the linear part of the model8. As such,
propositions 2 and 3 are unaffected.
8Note that this would also be the case if we assumed a mean squared error of the form Φt = (πt−1 −
E∗t−2[πt−1])2 = (πt−1 − πt−3)2, for example.
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Figure 8: Trajectories in two and three dimensions, respectively, of the first 103 iterations
of the model in which µ = 1 and Υ = 0. The remaining parameterisation is φ = 2, α = 0.7,
β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75, θπ = 0.3, θy = 1.
4.6 Local instability and global indeterminacy
The limit cycles and chaotic dynamics explored above exist in the locally explosive part
of the parameter space. As the global dynamics are bounded, however, inflation does not
diverge to ±∞ and as such the transversality condition is satisfied. Interestingly, as there
are an infinite number of trajectories that converge on a stable limit cycle (as in figure
4), and an infinite number of chaotic trajectories (as in figures 5 and 6), these dynamics
are examples of a type of global indeterminacy also analysed by Benhabib et al. (2001,
2002), Airaudo and Zanna (2012), and others. In this situation one can imagine a one-off
sunspot pinning down the state vector at t = 0, which then evolves along a perfect foresight
equilibrium trajectory to a unique limit cycle, or continues to evolve chaotically without
repeating itself. This is, in fact, exactly how the simulations in this section are computed.
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Figure 9: Trajectories, respectively, of the first iterations 10 to 140 of the model in which
µ = 1 and Υ = 0. The remaining parameterisation is φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75,
θπ = 0.3, θy = 1.
5 Monetary policy rules with persistence
In sections 3 and 4 we demonstrate three propositions. First, in the model with fixed
proportions of fully rational and AU agents, we demonstrate that the condition in (11) is
sufficient for determinacy and stability. Second, in the model with variable proportions of
fully rational and AU agents, we demonstrate that the condition in (11) is sufficient for local
determinacy and stability. Third, in the model with variable proportions of fully rational
and AU agents, we demonstrate that an increase in the cost of being fully rational can lead
to a Hopf bifurcation if the model starts out from a position of indeterminacy.
These results rely on a lack of persistence in the policy rule. In this final section, we
relax this assumption to check the robustness of the results in sections 3 and 4. Specifically,
we generalise the monetary policy rule to the standard rule with persistence,
rn,t = ρrrn,t−1 + (1− ρr)(θππt + θyyt), (55)
where ρr ∈ (0, 1].
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For the case of pure rational expectations, with n fixed and equal to 1, the policy space




θy > 1− ρr, (56)
which is a result obtained in Woodford (2003a), appendix C.
For the case of pure AU, with n fixed and equal to 0, using the monetary policy rule









(1− ρr)(θy + ψκθπ)
]
πt−2. (57)





(1− ρr)(θy + ψκθπ)
− ρr






Denoting the trace of the model in (58) by τ and the determinant by ∆, necessary and
sufficient conditions for stability are,
1. ∆ < 1,
2. 1− τ + ∆ > 0,
3. 1 + τ + ∆ > 0.
As τ and ∆ are both positive the third condition is not binding, and for ρr < 1 condition 3
yields the familiar condition θπ +
1−β
κ
θy > 1. But condition 1 adds a further restriction on
persistence in the monetary policy rule, given by,
ρr <
θπψκ
θy + ψκ(1 + θπ)
. (59)
Thus we have our fourth result:
Proposition 4: With persistence in the interest rate, the policy space (θπ, θy) under rational
expectations is increased to θπ +
1−β
κ




θy > 1 and persistence is constrained by (59).
By considering the limiting case of θy = 0, one can see that (59) restricts the stability region
of the model with n = 0 quite substantially. This is further illustrated by considering the


















Figure 10: Stability for model with persistence in the monetary policy rule, as a function
of θπ and ρr, with φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75, θy = 0.5, for n = 0 (dashed line),
n = 0.5 (solid line), and n = 1 (dot-dashed line). (ρr, θπ) combinations above the
constraints imply saddle path stability; the white area is saddle path stable for n = 0.5.
rn,t = rn,t−1 + αππt + αyyt, (60)
then the case αy = 0 gives ∆rn,t = θπ∆pt, where πt = pt−pt−1 and pt is the price level. Thus
rn,t = θπpt, and (60) is a price level rule. Putting απ = (1− ρr)θπ and αy = (1− ρr)θy into




αy > 0 and the policy space under AU is απ +
(1−βξ)
κ
αy > 1. Hence under rational
expectations and ρr = 1, at least one slightly positive feedback from inflation and output is
necessary and sufficient to result in saddle-path stability. Under AU and ρr = 1, the policy
space is considerably reduced for plausible values of the Calvo contract parameter ξ. Thus
proposition 4 qualifies propositions 1 and 2, and implies that the stability properties of the
New Keynesian model with AU are sensitive to changes in the monetary policy rule. Again,
this reinforces the existing results discussed in the introduction.
Finally, we consider the case with interest rate smoothing in which n ∈ (0, 1). By
substituting (30) into the Taylor rule with persistence in (55) and rearranging we get the
equivalent equilibrium condition to (31), except now with interest rate smoothing:
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Figure 11: Root-locus plot for model with persistence in the monetary policy rule, with
θπ = 1.5, θy = 0.75, φ = 2, α = 0.7, β = 0.99, ξ = 0.75, n = 0.5, for ρr = 0.5, 0.7. The Hopf















































where the new composite parameters are,
E = (κ− κψ)(βθy)−1,
F = κψ(βθy)
−1.
Note that when ρr = 0, i.e. no interest rate smoothing, (62) is identical to (33).







































where zt = πt−1 and zzt = zt−1 = πt−2 as before. Figure 10 plots the stability condition for
this model alongside the stability conditions for the special cases n = 0 and n = 1 discussed
above. This stability condition has been computed numerically, and lies in between the
stability conditions for n = 0 and n = 1. The (ρr, θπ) combinations shaded in white are
saddle path stable for the case n = 0.5 in figure 1, and the (ρr, θπ) combinations shaded in
grey are explosive. Thus, as in the case of pure anticipated utility, the Taylor condition is
insufficient for saddle path stability in the case with n ∈ (0, 1), although the constraint on ρr
is not as severe as in the case of pure anticipated utility. The analysis in this section suggests
that current central banking practice may not ensure saddle path stability if the degree of
interest rate smoothing is high. In fact, as figure 11 demonstrates, a Hopf bifurcation
occurs in this model as ρr increases past some critical value, even when the standard Taylor
condition holds. Again, this result implies that the stability properties of the New Keynesian
model with AU are sensitive to changes in the monetary policy rule, reinforcing the existing
results discussed in the introduction.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper constructs and explores the monetary policy consequences of the workhorse
New Keynesian model with AU learning and heterogeneous agents. First, we derive the
model with a fixed proportion n of fully rational agents and a fixed proportion 1 − n of
anticipated utility agents, in a similar manner to Massaro (2013). We then extend the model
to include reinforcement learning along the lines of Branch and McGough (2010). Using
this model, we demonstrate four propositions. First, the rational expectations determinacy
condition is sufficient for determinacy and stability when n is fixed. Second, the rational
expectations determinacy condition is sufficient for local determinacy and stability when n
varies according to reinforcement learning. Third, when monetary policy is such that the
dynamics are indeterminate, limit cycles can exist, and may be followed by a rational route
to randomness. Fourth, the rational expectations determinacy condition not is sufficient for
determinacy and stability in the presence of interest rate smoothing.
These results are consistent with the general message of the behavioural New Keynesian
literature, i.e. qualified support for the existing monetary policy orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it
is worth highlighting that while some papers in the literature find that the Taylor condition
is sufficient for determinacy and stability (e.g. Pecora and Spelta, 2017), others find that
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this is not the case (e.g. Branch and McGough, 2010). There does not appear to be a
straightforward answer as to why this is the case, with part of the problem being the inherent
complexity of the models - and therefore a lack of analytical results - and part of the problem
being the diversity of monetary policy rules used in the literature. For example, while our
model uses a Taylor rule that conditions on observable output and inflation, Branch and
McGough (2010) use a Taylor rule that conditions on forecasts of output and inflation, and
this difference is likely to affect the stability results. The only obvious resolution to this
problem is to study the stability properties of an “inventory of monetary policy rules” in the
major bounded rational approaches - including at least Euler learning, anticipated utility,
and internal rationality - along the lines of Lubik and Marzo (2007).
On the other hand, our results concerning interest rate smoothing are dissimilar to the
standard results on interest rate smoothing - e.g. Bullard and Mitra (2007) - in which
monetary policy inertia improves the stability properties of rational expectations models
and promotes the learnability of rational expectations equilibria. Our result, in which the
stability region is substantially reduced in the presence of interest rate smoothing, is similar
to that of Gasteiger (2014), who finds that monetary policy inertia reduces the space of de-
terminate optimal policy rules in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations.
Again, differing results may partly be due to differences over the type of policy rule used,
with Bullard and Mitra (2007) using Taylor rules with lagged observations and forecasts of
output and inflation, rather than contemporary observations. But more straightforwardly,
the benefits of interest rate smoothing in rational expectations models are usually attributed
to the ability of current interest rates to signal future interest rate movements when policy
inertia is present. Thus,
[A]n effective response by the Fed to inflationary pressures, say, requires that the
private sector be able to believe that the entire future path of short rates has
changed. A policy that maintains interest rates at a higher level for a period of
time once they are raised . . . is one that, if understood by the private sector, will
allow a moderate adjustment of current short rates to have a significant effect on
long rates. Such a policy offers the prospect of significant effects of central-bank
policy upon aggregate demand, without requiring excessively volatile short-term
interest rates. (Woodford, 2003b, pp.863).
In other words, under rational expectations, the interest rate in period t provides informa-
tion about the interest rate in period t + 1 when policy follows a rule like (55), and can
therefore stabilise expectations. As noted by Eusepi and Preston (2018), this stabilising
function of interest rate smoothing is lost when expectations are backwards looking, and
the backwards looking dynamic introduced by policy inertia may instead interact with the
backwards looking dynamic introduced by expectational inertia to generate instability. This
simple observation illustrates the complexity with which demand management interacts with
private sector behaviour, and the consequent importance of testing policy rules on a variety
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of private sector behaviours, rather than relying exclusively on rational expectations.
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Benhabib, J., M. Schmitt-Grohé, and M. Uribe (2001). The periods of Taylor rules. Journal
of Economic Theory 96 (1-2), 40–69.
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Appendix
A Deriving the reduced form model
In this appendix we explain how to arrive at the reduced form equation (30), which leads
in a straightforward manner to the reduced form equation for output (31), and thus the
reduced form model analysed in the main body of the text.
There are two ways to derive (30), the first of which is the most straightforward and is
emphasised in the main body of the text. Substituting expectations into (13) we have,
α1c
AU













ω2,t = (1− β)γAUt + βγAUt −
(
























[α5wt − α6(rn,t − πt−1)]. (A.2)
















(rn,t − πt−1). (A.3)
To proceed, we can either assume that profit is distributed in proportion to economic activity,
as in the main body of the text, or we can assume that profit is distributed equally. In the












































Substituting (A.8) into (A.3), and substituting out for the composite parameters α1 - α5




























and we are thus left with (30) in the main body of the text. Given (30) and the monetary












the consumption of rational agents is determined by (12), i.e.,
cREt = Et [cREt+1 − rt+1], (A.11)





However, we can ignore (A.11) and (A.12) in the reduced form model, as neither yt nor c
RE
t
nor cAUt are state variables; it is precisely this fact which lets us derive the analytical results
in the main body of the paper.










(wt + ht), (A.13)
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(rn,t − πt−1), (A.18)
or,





(rn,t − πt−1), (A.19)
which, interestingly, is a type of “Old Keynesian” (or “textbook Keynesian”) consumption
function.









nt(yt − cREt )
1− nt
. (A.20)
Substituting this term into (A.19) and rearranging, we arrive at,
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rn,t − πt−1 =
(1− β)nt
β(1− nt)
(cREt − yt). (A.21)
This should be compared to the expression in (30), and holds when profit income is equally
split across households rather than being split in proportion to activity as in the main body
of the paper. However, we note that β ≈ 1, and therefore,
(1− β)n
β(1− n)
≈ 0 for n 1. (A.22)
In fact, for β = 0.99 as in the numerical examples in the text, (1−β)n
β(1−n) < 0.1 for n < 0.9,
then rises rapidly as n is increased past 0.9. We therefore expect the dynamics of the model
with (30) to be a reasonable approximation to the dynamics of the model with (A.21),
particularly in the case with n fixed (and less than 0.9), or close to the steady state in the
case with n variable.
B Deriving the Linearized Consumption Function
Solving (1) for a symmetric equilibrium forward in time and using the law of iterated ex-








; i ≥ 1 (B.1)
We now express the solution to the household optimization problem for Ct and Ht that
are functions of point expectations {EtWt+i}∞i=1, {EtRt+1,t+i}∞i=1 and {EtΓt+i}∞i=0 treated as
exogenous processes given at time t. With point expectations we use (B.1) to obtain the
following optimal decision for Ct+i given point expectations EtRt+1,t+i










Substituting (B.2) and (B.3) into the forward-looking household budget constraint, using∑∞
i=0 β
i = 1


















































































Consumption is then given by (B.4) assuming point expectations or by the symmetric form
of the Euler equation (1) under full rationality (i.e. households know symmetric nature of
equilibrium with Ct(j) = Ct). Ct is a function of rational point expectations {EtWt+i}∞i=1,
{EtRt,t+i}∞i=i and {EtΓt+i}∞i=1 which can be treated as exogenous processes given at time t
or as rational model-consistent expectations.
The linearized consumption function (2) where xt = logXt/X is the log of each variable
Xt = Ct, Wt, Rt, Ω1,t, Ω2,t, Γt, Ht relative to its deterministic steady state X, derived in a
straightforward manner as the first-order Taylor series expansion about that steady state.
Since Etf(Xt) ≈ f(Et(Xt)); Etf(XtYt)) ≈ f(Et(Xt)Et(Yt)) up to a first-order Taylor-series
expansion, assuming point expectations is equivalent to using this linear approximation.
C Deriving the Recursive Form of Optimal Price Setting
In the first order conditions for Calvo contracts and expressions for value functions we are








where Xt,t+k has the property Xt,t+k = Xt,t+1Xt+1,t+k and Xt,t = 1 (for example an inflation,
interest or discount rate over the interval [t, t+ k]).
Lemma
Ωt can be expressed as
Ωt = Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1] (C.2)
Proof





















= Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1] 
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Then summations Ω3,t and Ω4,t are of the form considered in the Lemma above. Applying
the Lemma gives (5)-(5) in the main text.
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